Programming and copyright

"glen herrmannsfeldt" <gah@ugcs.caltech.edu> schrieb im Newsbeitrag
news:5smdndldF9p6dXjcRVn-qg@comcast.com...

> Wasn't there a story about some TLA (three letter agency)
> putting taps on fiber optic cables on the bottom of the ocean?
> (Without either end noticing.)

Urban legends? Just PR?? Iam sure if you throw a hell of money at something,
you can do things that are close to impossible. But the infromation warefare
is much easier to do by spreading out legends, myths etc. Hollywood is
always aside ("Enemy of the state" , nice movie ;-)

Regards
Falk

"Nick" <char-DONTBUGME-les@YY.iiedotcnam.france> schrieb im Newsbeitrag
news:212cu0hkju645r6o1stlqfov5qo65mfnnm@4ax.com...

> Using a volatile sram + battery to keep the code scares me because i
> need to be sure that the product work in more than 10 years.
> I think I'll settle for an external prom chip and a special hanshake.

This discussion is not new, there is a article/website dicussing this very
problem (Sorry, dont have the link handy) . And the external PROM/uC/CPLD
ist not as secure as you might think.

Regards
Falk

glen herrmannsfeldt <gah@ugcs.caltech.edu> writes:
> Wasn't there a story about some TLA (three letter agency)
> putting taps on fiber optic cables on the bottom of the ocean?
> (Without either end noticing.)

They almost certainly have the capability to do so, but if they've done
it we wouldn't know, would we?

The nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) is
specially equipped to allow undersea cables to be pulled into a payload
bay and worked on.

That last-mentioned idea is the equivalent of the classical
"one-time-pad", which is inherently unbreakable, but also not very
practical.
Peter Alfke

... Specially when you are talking about *re*-configurable devices :)

I was going to suggest quantum encryption but even that is being
tampered these days.

Yep, I guess it is better to stay on the side of the good guys and
attack the bad guys with the weight of the law. Since the bitstream is
usually copied verbatim, sneaking a watermark in the IP may be a good
way to hold your case in court.

Regards.

--
PabloBleyerKocik /"I believed that people would become programmers
pbleyer        / and not need companies as much. You can see how
@embedded.cl / laughable that was." -- Steve Wozniak

On Thu, 13 Jan 2005 09:31:09 GMT, Ben Twijnstra <btwijnstra@gmail.com>
wrote:

>I suggest you read the following article:
>
>http://www.altera.com/literature/wp/wp_m2dsgn.pdf
>
>This uses a MAX II as a 'dongle'. The MAX II is - let's say - non-volatile
>and generates a continuous stream of bits. The same algorithm runs in the
>FPGA, and if there's a mismatch, the FPGA quits working.
>
>I also have an unofficial whitepaper plus reference design that uses a MAX3
>device to do something similar, albeit with a less cryptologically sound
>algorithm. Contact me on bentw at chello dot nl if you want it. The gmail
>address is a spam trap.
>
>Best regards,
>
>
>Ben


Thank you very much Ben, this white paper is very interesting. It will
provide a fairly good level of reliability for our design.
I shall contact you in a few days.

Thank you again, you relieve me of a great pressure.

Nick

>This discussion is not new, there is a article/website dicussing this very
>problem (Sorry, dont have the link handy) . And the external PROM/uC/CPLD
>ist not as secure as you might think.

Sure it's not safe at all, but it increase by a small margin the cost
of cloning.
Anyway, Ben's white paper sounds very promising and i'll use a similar
device.

Regards
Nick

"Peter Alfke" <peter@xilinx.com> wrote in message 
news:1105645416.101820.302790@c13g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
> That last-mentioned idea is the equivalent of the classical
> "one-time-pad", which is inherently unbreakable, but also not very
> practical.

Oh absolutely. I just used it as an example.

OTOH, it is simple and each bit is decrypted at the place it is used.

If you have decryption done in a specific region, sooner or later someone 
will find the cleartext exit point and intercept it as it emerges.

Smartcard hardware and software does try to take defensive measures but none 
would claim to be uncrackable. One can only make it too difficult/expensive 
to be worth doing.

Eric Smith (eric-no-spam-for-me@brouhaha.com) wrote:
: glen herrmannsfeldt <gah@ugcs.caltech.edu> writes:
: > Wasn't there a story about some TLA (three letter agency)
: > putting taps on fiber optic cables on the bottom of the ocean?
: > (Without either end noticing.)

: They almost certainly have the capability to do so, but if they've done
: it we wouldn't know, would we?

: The nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) is
: specially equipped to allow undersea cables to be pulled into a payload
: bay and worked on.

Indeed.  Quite a feat in itself, but then remember that before the advent of
optically pumbed fibre amplifiers the fibre optic cores were encased 
in a high volage power supply for the amplifiers / regenerators!

All change again soon, for short distances at least quantum entanglement 
based encryption (for key exchanges) is now a fibre based reality... - the
USP of this tech. is that by the (current) laws of Physics we *would* know 
if the data traveling through the fibre is tapped.  So they'll just have to
tap it somewhere else...

---

cds

Christopher,
There's an article all about Quantum Cryptography in this month's SciAm.
Google   "Best-Kept Secrets" sciam
These people can do it over 120km! http://www.magiqtech.com/press/qpn.pdf
Cheers, Syms.

"c d saunter" <christopher.saunter@durham.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:cs75m8$g8$1@heffalump.dur.ac.uk...
>
>
> All change again soon, for short distances at least quantum entanglement
> based encryption (for key exchanges) is now a fibre based reality... - the
> USP of this tech. is that by the (current) laws of Physics we *would* know
> if the data traveling through the fibre is tapped.  So they'll just have
to
> tap it somewhere else...
>
> ---
>
> cds